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NOTES
Sharing the Wealth: Don’t Call Us. We’ll
Call You: Why Revenue Sharing Is a
Permissive Subject and Therefore the
Labor Exemption Does Not Apply
Jessica Cohen*
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of free agency to professional sports has
contributed to increased competition among teams over top players.
Professional team owners are bidding competitively at inflated
market prices for highly desired players.1 Team owners do this with
the hope that their franchises will win more games, resulting in
increased profits.2 Thus, free agency has helped create an increasing
disparity among professional sports teams, which often leads to a
lower quality product. To survive, leagues must use various
mechanisms to equalize the competitive balance among teams,
including revenue sharing, the salary cap, and the draft.

*

J.D. candidate 2002, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., University of Michigan at
Ann Arbor. Upon graduation, Jessica will work at Proskauer Rose LLP, in New York, New
York. She would like to thank Professor Lanzarone for all of his guidance and his support.
She would also like to thank her family and friends for their patience.
1
See Mark Conrad, Mark’s View: A-Rod and Baseball’s House of Cards, at
http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/Articles%202000/Arodcontract.htm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2002). In the 2000 season, Alex Rodriguez signed a 10-year $252 million contract
with the Texas Rangers. Id. See also David Rothstein, The Salary Cap: Legal Analysis of
and Practical Suggestions for Collective Bargaining in Professional Basketball, 11 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 251 (1994) (specifically discussing the way NBA team
owners are willing to open their checkbooks to acquire the top players); Jeffrey E. Levine,
The Legality and Efficacy of the National Basketball Association Salary Cap, 11 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 73 (1992).
2
Rothstein, supra note 1, at 251-52 (noting that sports team owners pay the top players
so that their teams will win more games, thereby increasing gate receipts).

COHEN.FINAL

610

2/15/02 3:00 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 12

This paper will focus on revenue sharing as one of the many
solutions intended to balance competition among teams.
Specifically, this paper will examine revenue sharing of income from
external sources, such as television broadcast contracts, merchandise
licensing, and gate receipts.3 The questions of whether revenue
sharing is a mandatory or permissive subject of collective bargaining
and whether the labor exemption applies to revenue sharing will be
addressed.
Part I surveys the labor history of collective bargaining as it relates
to revenue sharing and the salary cap in selected professional sports
leagues. Part II focuses on the basics of labor and antitrust law, and
their conflicting policies. Part III investigates the statutory labor
exemption, the evolution of the non-statutory labor exemption in the
Supreme Court, and its application to professional sports. Part IV
analyzes whether revenue sharing is a mandatory or permissive
subject of collective bargaining. Finally, Part V focuses on whether
the labor exemption applies to revenue sharing in two alternative
hypothetical situations: first, when revenue sharing is categorized as
a permissive subject and is in a labor agreement; and second, when
revenue sharing is categorized as a mandatory subject that is
unilaterally imposed after impasse.
This paper argues that revenue sharing is a permissive subject of
collective bargaining because revenue sharing does not directly
affect the players’ terms and conditions of employment.4 This paper
concludes that the labor exemption does not apply to revenue sharing
if it is a permissive subject; however, if revenue sharing is found to
be a mandatory subject, contrary to the conclusions of this paper, the
labor exemption would apply.5

3

There are many different types of revenue sharing. Although they are all crucial to
the survival of a league, the only type discussed in this paper involves the sharing of
external revenues, such as television contracts, gate receipts and merchandise licensing.
4
See infra Part IV.
5
See infra Part V.
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I. EXAMPLES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SELECTED SPORTS: THE
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION & MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
A. National Basketball Association (hereinafter “NBA”)
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the increase in free agency,
the NBA experienced growing competitive disparity among its
teams. To solve this problem,6 in 1983 the NBA and the National
Basketball Players Association (hereinafter “NBPA”) negotiated the
first-ever “salary cap” in professional sports.7 The key to the salary
cap was a revenue-sharing formula that guaranteed the players 53%
of the league’s gross revenues.The parties hoped that this would
enable small-market, financially weaker teams to compete with their
big-market rivals. Over time, however, it became increasingly
obvious that the many loopholes of the “soft” cap8 made it easy for
creative owners to circumvent the cap.9 Following a 191-day labor
dispute, on January 7, 1999, the NBA and the NBPA reached an
agreement that purported to rectify some of these loopholes through
a revised team salary cap10 and an individual cap.11

6

See D. Albert Daspin, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops: Fouling Out
the Salary Cap, 62 IND. L.J. 95, 122 (1986). The purpose of the provision was to level the
competition among NBA teams. Id.
7
Rothstein, supra note 1, at 252 n.6.
8
The “soft” cap is one in which teams can use creative accounting to shift player
salaries to other years to make room in the cap to sign new players.
9
Dan Messeloff, Note, The NBA’s Deal with the Devil: The Antitrust Implications of
the 1999 NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 521, 523 (2000).
10
Although the revised team salary cap is still a “soft” cap, it restricted the amount of
money a team could spend on its roster to no more than $30 million in 1999 and $34 million
in 2000. See also Messeloff, supra note 9, at 523.
11
The individual salary cap limits the amount that a team can spend on a single player.
For example, a player that has up to five years of experience in the NBA can earn no more
than $9 million. Mike Wise, Pro Basketball: The Settlement; With Little Time on Clock,
N.B.A. and Players Settle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at A1. Unlike the revised team salary
cap that is a “soft” cap, this is a “hard” cap and there are virtually no exceptions. Id.
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B. Major League Baseball (hereinafter “MLB”)
In the summer of 1994, MLB and the Major League Baseball
Players Association (hereinafter “MLBPA”) could not agree on a
solution to the economic disparity and competitive imbalance in
MLB.12 The owners claimed that they would not open spring
training without a salary cap, while the players maintained that they
would not start the season with a salary cap.13 So in August 1994,
MLB had its eighth work stoppage in twenty-five years. In
December of that year, with no settlement reached, the owners
unilaterally imposed their salary cap. In 1995, the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter “NLRB”) General Counsel warned the
owners that their action was illegal because they had not reached
impasse.14 Those words of advice caused the owners to bring
baseball back for the 1995 season without a salary cap.15
In November 1996, MLB and the MLBPA negotiated a new
Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter “CBA”). Even though
a “luxury tax”16 was implemented, the system did not correct the

12
Mark Conrad, Mark’s Sports Law News, Owners Give Selig Powers to Share
Revenues, Reject Trades (January 20, 2000), at http://www.sportslawnews.com/
archive/Articles%202000/Seligpowers.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002); Charles D. Marvine,
Comment, Baseball’s Unilaterally Imposed Salary Cap: This Baseball Cap Doesn’t Fit, 43
KAN. L. REV. 625 n.1 (1995) (citing Richard Justice, With Baseball’s Last Out, a Strike,
WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1994, at A1); Marcus Leazer, Mark’s Sports Law News, Baseball’s
Rich Get Richer (No Surprise!) (Dec. 9, 2000), at http://www.sportslawnews.com/
archive/Articles%202000/Seligtestimony.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
13
Marvine, supra note 12, at 626; Mark Maske, Baseball Season Wiped Out; Team
Owners Cancel Remaining Schedule and World Series, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1994, at A1,
A6; Mark Maske, Baseball’s Labor Talks Collapse; Team Owners Install Salary Cap
System; Litigation Looms, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1994, at A1.
14
Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 191 n.32 (2001).
15
Id.
16
Although it wasn’t called a “salary cap,” the “luxury tax” acted like a salary cap in
that it was a cost-containment plan on player salaries. The luxury tax instituted a system
where the five teams with the highest payrolls above a certain threshold (in 1997 - $51
million; in 1998 - $55 million; in 1999 - $58.9 million; and there was no luxury tax for
2000) were required to pay a tax on the excess amount (in 1997 and 1998 – 35%; in 1999 –
34%). The money was paid into a revenue-sharing fund that was redistributed among the
thirteen small-market teams. Messeloff, supra note 9, at 562.
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disparities in professional baseball.17 Since the CBA expired in
2001, the parties are now in a position to decide how to negotiate a
new, more efficacious system.
In anticipation of these daunting problems, MLB appointed a panel
of experts, the Blue Ribbon Panel (hereinafter “Panel”),18 to review
the state of professional baseball and recommend some solutions. 19
In July of 2000, the Panel recommended that for the good of
professional baseball, the owners should pool some of their
resources.20 The Panel issued a ninety-three-page report that
suggested various solutions, including a system in which clubs would
share 40 to 50% of all local revenues, which would provide
assistance to the financially weaker franchises.21 The Panel also
suggested that a 50% competitive-balance tax be instituted whenever
teams would spend above the specified threshold of $84 million.22 In
addition, the Panel recommended that all teams spend a minimum of
$40 million on player salaries.23 In this proposed system, lowrevenue teams would receive resources from an expanded central

17

Messeloff, supra, note 9, at 562. In 1999, the New York Yankees spent $92 million
on their player payroll and paid $4.8 million in luxury taxes. It is apparent that the luxury
tax did not deter the Yankees in their pursuit to bid for top market free agents. Another
criticism of the luxury tax is that there are no requirements on small-market teams’ use of
the money. This results in little or no effect on the competitive balance of the teams. It has
been argued that a way to rectify this is to provide incentives for small-market clubs to
reinvest the proceeds from the revenue sharing system into their rosters. Id. at 561.
18
The Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel
on Baseball Economics, July 2000 (R. Levin, G. Mitchell, P. Volcker, G. Will) [hereinafter
Blue Ribbon Panel] (on file with author). The Panel was comprised of Yale University
President Richard C. Levin, former Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, political
commentator George F. Will and former Federal Reserve Chair Paul A. Volcker. There
were no representatives of either the league or the players association on the Panel. Id. at 1.
19
The Panel found some disturbing facts, including: clubs with payrolls in the upper
half of the league have won every playoff game since 1994; and nine of the ten clubs
participating in the last five World Series had payrolls ranking in the top 25% of the league.
Id. at 10.
20
Andrew Goodman, Mark’s Sports Law News: Baseball Commission Calls for More
Revenue Sharing (July 18, 2000), at http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/
Articles%202000/MLBreport.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
21
Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 18, at 14.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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fund of pooled local revenues to aid in balancing the competition.24
It is unclear whether MLB will choose to adopt some or all of
these proposed solutions; however, something must be done to save
professional baseball from its current state of competitive imbalance.
At this time, few teams other than the New York Yankees can meet
the salary demands of the most desired free agents in professional
baseball.25 During the current off-season, Jason Giambi signed a
seven-year contract worth $120 million with the Yankees.26 Last
season, the Yankees’ payroll for pitchers alone reached $40 million,
a sum that exceeded the entire payroll of eight MLB teams.27
Competitive-balancing systems must be scrutinized to determine
whether they are consistent with labor and antitrust laws. The
application of these laws may be in conflict with each other.
Therefore, the impact of these statutes on the professional sports
industry must be analyzed.
II. LABOR AND ANTITRUST LAW IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
In analyzing the application of federal labor and antitrust law to
the professional sports industry, it is important to remember that the
sports context is unique in several ways. Unlike almost any other
industry, in order for any sport to succeed, clubs that compete on the
24

Local revenues (gate receipts, television, radio, ballpark concessions, advertising,
publications, parking, suite rentals, post-season and training) are the largest single
component of most clubs’ annual revenue. The ratio between the teams with the highest and
lowest revenues has more than doubled between 1995 and 2000. It is likely that this
provision will make up the difference in competitive balance among the teams because this
is where the large discrepancy in team revenue lies. Id. at 8, 15.
25
Between 1994 and 1999, only three teams made a profit: the New York Yankees, the
Cleveland Indians and the Colorado Rockies. The rest of the MLB teams have
lost a total of $1.4 billion dollars. Andrew Goodman, Mark’s Sports Law News:
Baseball Commission Calls for More Revenue Sharing (July 18, 2000), at
http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/Articles%202000/MLBreport.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2002).
26
Mark Feinsand, Its Official: Giambi a Yankee; Slugger Signs Seven-Year
Deal, MLB.COM (Dec. 13, 2001), at http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/
mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=mlb_20011213_giambi_news&team_id=mlb (last visited
Feb. 10, 2002).
27
Leazer, supra note 12.
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field must cooperate, to some extent, off the field.28 In most other
industries, each business owner is concerned solely with its own
success. In contrast, in the sports industry each team’s success is
dependent upon the success of the other teams in the league, which
in turn improves the product.29
The professional sports industry is also unique because unlike
most other employment situations, the employer has the power to
implement labor-market restraints on its employees. 30 Although
these restraints might otherwise compell employees to find
alternative sources of employment, due to a limited source of
alternative employers, the restraints remain. This is known as a
monopsony. Monopsonies arise “when the resource is uniquely
valuable in its current use, so that even if the price is depressed by
monopsony, sellers [players] are unable to find alternative buyers
[professional sports leagues].”31 For example, professional football
players do not have an equivalent alternative to the National Football
League (hereinafter “NFL”). While they might have other options in
the Arena Football League and the like, those types of opportunities
do not compare financially or competitively. Therefore, if the NFL
were to implement an unfavorable restraint, NFL players would not
have leverage to leave the League. Rather, much of their leverage is
from labor and antitrust legal challenges.32
Lastly, the industry of professional sports presents a situation
wherein the fundamental federal policies of antitrust and labor law
are in conflict with one another. Antitrust law bars any unreasonable
agreements in restraint of trade, whereas labor law organizes the
28
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 11718 (1984) (explaining that a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of
competition that the NCAA seeks to market is to be preserved); United States v. Nat’l
Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (explaining that the professional
sports industry is unique because competitors cannot compete too hard with each other offthe-field or it would likely lead to financial failure).
29
Rothstein, supra note 1, at 271 (citing Donald G. Kempf, Jr., The Misapplication of
Antitrust Law to Professional Sports Leagues, 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 628 (1983)).
30
Marvine, supra note 12, at 648.
31
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J.,
dissenting), aff’d, 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
32
Brown, 50 F.3d 1041 (Wald, J., dissenting); Marvine, supra note 12, at 648.
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efforts of employees, usually in the form of an agreement, against
their employer.33 The following section will provide a brief
introduction to antitrust and labor law.
A. Antitrust Law
Antitrust law is primarily embodied in the Sherman Act.34 Section
1 of the Sherman Act states, “every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.”35 The Supreme Court has determined that
only unreasonable restraints of trade violate the Sherman Act.36
Courts apply two different standards to decide if a challenged
restraint is in violation of the antitrust laws. They are: a) rule of
reason, or b) per se. Under the rule of reason, a court will do a
comprehensive analysis of the restraint’s effect on market
competition by balancing its pro-competitive and anti-competitive
effects.37 Alternatively, the per se rule provides that certain restraints
are so anti-competitive by nature that they are inherently illegal.38

33
PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES,
PROBLEMS 189 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter SPORTS LAW TEXT].
34
E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1994).
35
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
36
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98
(1984) (recognizing that because all contracts are restraints of trade, Congress must have
intended the Sherman Act to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade); Bd. of Trade of
City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911).
37
Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. Specifically, to evaluate a restraint under a Rule of
Reason analysis, a court should look at whether the restraint merely regulates and promotes
competition, or suppresses and destroys competition. Id.
38
Under a per se analysis, a court could determine that the restraint violates the
Sherman Act without an inquiry into the harm that the restraint causes in the relevant
market. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940), the Court
determined that any conspiracy to fix prices was a per se violation of the Sherman Act, even
if the plaintiff could not show that the defendants had enough market power.
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B. Labor Law
The National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter “NLRA” or the
“Act”) was passed in 1935.39 The Act established an administrative
body, the NLRB, to serve two main functions: a) to run elections for
the selection of a bargaining agent; and b) to adjudicate unfair labor
practice (hereinafter “ULP”) charges.40 The purposes of the Act are:
a) to protect the public from industrial unrest that could lead to work
stoppages; b) to facilitate the peaceful negotiation of labormanagement disputes over wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment; and c) to ensure equal bargaining power
between employers and employees for collective bargaining. 41
The Act requires that the employer bargain with the union.42 This
duty applies to “mandatory subjects” of collective bargaining such as
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.43 The

39
The NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act, was originally passed in 1935. The 1947
Amendments established the NLRB. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)). See also THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT 26-27 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992).
40
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
41
Id.
42
Section 8(d) of the NLRA provides that:
“[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising there under, and the execution
of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if request by either
party, but such an obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession.”
Section 8(d) of the NLRA. Some labor scholars have noticed, however, that “going through
the motions of negotiating” undermines collective bargaining just as much as “bluntly
withholding recognition.” Archibald Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 1401, 1413 (1958); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and
the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1984). There must be a
distinction between surface bargaining—going through the motions with no real intent to
arrive at a settlement, which is unacceptable—and hard bargaining—to stand on the ground
of its negotiating position, which is totally permitted by the NLRA. SPORTS LAW TEXT,
supra note 33, at 273.
43
The duty to bargain only applies to mandatory subjects because of their increased
importance to the employer/employee relationship.
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duty to bargain includes the obligation to act in “good faith.”44 The
requirement to bargain over mandatory subjects remains in effect up
until the collective bargaining negotiations break down.45 The
breakdown in negotiations is known as “impasse.”46 Once impasse
has occurred, the employer is permitted to unilaterally impose
conditions, provided that they do not differ from pre-impasse
proposals.47 However, the duty to bargain may arise once again after
the breakdown when there is a reason for the parties to negotiate
again, such as when one of the parties has changed its position.48
The subjects that are not mandatory are either illegal or
permissive.49 Illegal subjects are those that violate any law.50
Permissive subjects include all subjects that are neither mandatory
nor illegal.51 Permissive subjects present different circumstances
than mandatory subjects for two significant reasons. First, the
employer has no duty to discuss these topics, or to supply
information about them to the union. Second, the union will not be
44
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943) (describing
the duty as an “. . . obligation of the parties to participate actively in the deliberations so as
to indicate a present intention to find a basis for agreement, and a sincere effort must be
made to reach a common ground.”).
45
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (even after bargaining has broken
down in good faith, the duty to bargain survives and the employer must be ready to resume
collective bargaining).
46
In Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982), the Court
defined impasse as a “temporary deadlock or hiatus in negotiations which in almost all cases
is eventually broken, through either a change of mind or the application of economic force.”
Id. at 412.
47
In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Court held that the employer violated the
requirement in 8(a)(5) to bargain in good faith by unilaterally implementing policies with
regard to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining (sick leave, increased wages, and
merit increases) without prior discussion of those proposals. According to the Court, if the
parties had not reached impasse, the unilateral imposition of mandatory terms amounts to a
refusal to negotiate and is a unfair labor practice.
48
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc., 454 U.S. at 412 (citing Charles B. Bonanno
Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 243 NLRB 1093, 1093-94 (1979)) (impasse is broken either
through a change of mind or the application of economic force).
49
First Nat’l Maint. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 n.13 (1981); NLRB v. Wooster Div.
Of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
50
NLRB v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 798 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing 29 U.S.C.A. §
158 (a)(5); 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(3)) (noting that illegal subjects cannot be bargained over
or insisted upon by either party).
51
First Nat’l Maint., 452 U.S. at 675, n.13; Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342.
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protected if it strikes or demands that management bargain over
these subjects.52 The duty to bargain does not extend to decisions
that involve “a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise,”53
or those that lie “at the core of entrepreneurial control,”54 even if the
decisions have a direct impact on employment. This allows
management the ability to make fundamental business decisions
unencumbered. However, the employer still has an obligation to
bargain over the effects of its business decisions on the employees.55
III. THE LABOR EXEMPTION
As illustrated in Part II, labor and antitrust law have fundamentally
different policies; hence, they may be in conflict in their application
to employer-employee relationships. Specifically, if antitrust laws
were to apply to the conduct of all professional sports leagues’, the
leagues and players associations would not be able to collectively
bargain. Furthermore, systems that were created in an attempt to
even out the competitive imbalance among sports teams (such as
revenue sharing), would not be implemented, due to the threat of
antitrust liability. Therefore, some accommodations had to be made.
The labor exemption enables unions and management to negotiate
over conditions of employment without fear of an antitrust
violation.56

52
In NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) an employer refused to agree to
the collective bargaining agreement unless the union agreed to a pre-strike voting provision
and the recognition of an additional union. Id. at 343. The NLRB and the Supreme Court
found that the provision did not involve wages, hours, or terms of employment within the
meaning of 8(d) of the NLRA and therefore the employer violated the labor laws by
insisting on a permissive subject. Id. at 349-50.
53
First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 677.
54
Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223, 226 (1964).
55
In First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. 666 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the
employer had a duty to bargain about the effects of their decision to terminate a contract
with one of its commercial customers, even though they had no duty to bargain about the
actual decision to terminate the contract since the decision was for purely economic reasons.
56
Mid-Am. Reg’l Bargaining Ass’n v. Will Cty. Carpenters Dist. Council, 675 F.2d
881, 890 n.22 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The exemptions would serve little purpose in furthering
national labor policy if employers risked liability under the antitrust laws for entering into
collective bargaining agreements.”).
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There are two different labor exemptions from antitrust law –
statutory and non-statutory. In the following section, the statutory
labor exemption and the limited scope of its application will be
described. Next, the purpose of the non-statutory labor exemption
will be reviewed. In the third part, two precedent-setting Supreme
Court cases will be examined to reveal the foundation of the nonstatutory exemption. Finally, the non-statutory labor exemption will
be described as it has been applied in a few key sports cases.
A. The Statutory Labor Exemption
The statutory labor exemption from antitrust laws reflects the
federal government’s strong interest in preserving the national labor
This exemption asserts that labor unions are not
policy.57
57

The labor exemption exists in various sections of the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1982); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1982); 29 U.S.C. §
113 (1982). These provisions include:
Section 6 of the 1914 Clayton Act:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust law shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor . . . organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help . . .
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982). Section 20 of the Clayton Act:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States . . . involving or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of
employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a
property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no
adequate remedy at law.
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). Section 104 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute . . . from doing . . . any of the following act: (a) Ceasing or refusing to
perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; (b) Becoming or
remaining a member of any labor organization, or of any employer organization,
regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in section 103 of this
title.
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combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.58 Other parts of the statutory labor exemption
protect collective action by a union, such as strikes, picketing, and
boycotts.59
The statutory exemption establishes that labor unions are not
conspiracies or combinations in restraint of trade, and it protects
collective activity by unions furthering union interests and labor
policy, even where it is anti-competitive.60 The statutory labor

29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982). Section 105 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the persons
participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an
unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the acts
enumerated in section 104 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 105 (1982). Section 113 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case
involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation;
or have direct, or indirect interests therein, or who are employees of the same
employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of
employers or employees; whether such dispute is (a) between one or more
employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations
of employees; (2) between one or more employers or association of employers; or
(3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more
employees and associations of employees; or when the case involves any
conflicting or competing interests in a ‘labor dispute’ . . . of ‘persons participating
or interested’ therein . . . (b) A person or association shall be held to be a person
participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and
if he or it is engaged in the same industry therein, or is a member, officer or agent
of any association composed in whole or in part of employers, or employees
engaged in such industry, trade, craft or occupation. (c) The term ‘labor dispute’
includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee.
29 U.S.C. § 113 (1982).
See supra note 57 (§ 6 of the Clayton Act); see also supra note 36 and accompanying

58

text.

59
See supra note 57 (§ 20 of the Clayton Act); see also SPORTS LAW TEXT, supra note
33, at 190-91.
60
Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 434
U.S. 801 (1977); Marvine, supra note 12, at 638.
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exemption does not cover concerted activity or agreements when a
labor organization ceases to act as a labor group or when it enters
into an illegal combination with a non-labor group.61 While it may
seem counter-intuitive, the statutory labor exemption enables union
activity to obtain a labor agreement, such as a strike, even though it
does not protect the collective bargaining agreement.62 The narrow
scope of the statutory labor exemption is problematic in most
industries, including professional sports. As a result, the Supreme
Court developed the non-statutory labor exemption to cover other
legitimate labor practices not covered in the statutory labor
exemption.
B. The Purpose of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
The non-statutory labor exemption was created by the Supreme
Court to extend the labor exemption to collective bargaining
activities not covered in the statutes.63 The Supreme Court said,
[I]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to require groups
of employers and employees to bargain together, but at the
same time to forbid them to make among themselves, or
with each other, any of the competition-restricting
agreements potentially necessary to make the process
work or its result mutually acceptable.64
This exemption covers certain union-employer collective
bargaining agreements, and has been used as a defense by sports

61
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 101; H.A. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors’
Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704, 714-15 (1981) (explaining that statutory antitrust immunity is
forfeited when a union combines with one or more employers in an effort to restrain trade);
see also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). The statutory exemption
does not apply when a union combines with a non-labor group. Id.
62
SPORTS LAW TEXT, supra note 33, at 190-91.
63
See infra Part III-C.
64
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996).
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leagues in many antitrust challenges by players and players’
associations.65
C. Supreme Court Precedent for the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
The Supreme Court was the first to extend the non-statutory labor
exemption to collective bargaining agreements between employers
and unions.66 As discussed previously, there are conflicting interests
between labor and antitrust laws. On the one hand, labor policy
preserves the rights of a union to better its conditions through
collective bargaining.67 On the other hand, the chief purpose of
antitrust law is to prevent collective, anti-competitive behavior.68
The Court’s conclusions suggest that where labor policies are
advanced properly, anti-competitive market interference will be
tolerated.
The next section will review Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea, Inc.69 and
Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100,70 two Supreme Court cases that have addressed the
non-statutory labor exemption.

65
Brown, 518 U.S. 231; Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F. 3d 684 (2d Cir.
1995); Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. California
Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606,
611-12 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen
of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 729-30 (1965)); Powell v. Nat’l
Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988).
66
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325
U.S. 797 (1945).
67
Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 806.
68
THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 1.02 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing the broad policy reasons for the
antitrust laws).
69
381 U.S. 676 (1965).
70
421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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1. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen
of North America v. Jewel Tea, Inc.
In Jewel Tea, 71 the Plaintiff, a meat retailer and a member of a
multi-employer bargaining unit, challenged a marketing-hours
restriction incorporated in an industry-wide collective bargaining
agreement. The Defendant Union, as a representative of butchers in
the Chicago area, insisted on a provision that restricted the sale of
fresh meat to daytime hours, to protect the unionized butchers from
employer pressures to work at night. The Plaintiff claimed the
restriction violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by impeding
his ability to compete freely and effectively in the product market.
Justice White, writing for the Supreme Court, held that because the
marketing-hours restriction furthered national labor policy and was a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining negotiated through arm’slength bargaining, the union-employer agreement was exempt from
antitrust scrutiny.72
2. Connell Construction v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
In Connell,73 the Union picketed and then contracted with Connell,
a general contractor, to subcontract work only to firms that had a
current agreement with the Defendant Union. At the time of the
contract, Connell did not have any employees that were represented
by the Union. The contract made the employee non-members of the
Defendant Union ineligible to compete for Connell’s available work.
Although the Court recognized the need for a limited non-statutory
exemption from antitrust scrutiny,74 the Union’s goal, which was to
efficiently organize as many subcontractors as possible, did not serve
to further the labor policies of the non-statutory labor exemption.75
The restraint dealt with, and adversely affected, non-members of the
Defendant Union, which failed to promote labor policy, i.e., to
71
72
73
74
75

381 U.S. 676 (1965).
Id. at 689-92.
421 U.S. 616 (1975).
Id. at 622.
Id. at 624-25.
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accomplish union objectives for its own members.76 In addition, the
restraint had substantial anti-competitive consequences on the
industry. It “contravene[d] antitrust policies to a degree not justified
by congressional labor policy, and therefore [could not] claim a nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws.”77 While the
Court recognized that the goals of federal labor law could never be
achieved if ordinary anti-competitive effects of collective bargaining
were held to violate the antitrust laws, these circumstances were very
different. Thus, the Court recognized the existence of the nonstatutory labor exemption, but held that it did not apply.
D. The Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption to Sports
The professional sports industry has had numerous opportunities to
test the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption. Many sports
cases involved legal challenges to league attempts to even out the
competitive imbalance among teams by such means as revenue
sharing, the salary cap, and the draft. Relying on the Supreme
Court’s guidance as to the scope of the non-statutory labor
exemption, lower courts have applied the non-statutory labor
exemption to professional sports. The following section focuses on
the standards developed by two different circuits in Mackey v.
National Football League78 and Wood v. National Basketball
Association,79 and then discusses the Supreme Court’s refinement of
the application of the non-statutory labor exemption in Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc.80
1. Mackey v. National Football League
In Mackey,81 several NFL players filed a lawsuit against the
League, its member teams, and the NFL commissioner. They
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 622.
Id. at 623.
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).

COHEN.FINAL

626

2/15/02 3:00 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 12

challenged what was known as the “Rozelle Rule,” which required a
franchise signing a player who had played out his option year to
compensate the player’s former franchise in the form of cash, player
contracts, or draft picks. Although the Rozelle Rule had been in
effect during the 1968 and 1970 collective bargaining agreements,
the Players Association rejected the provision when the 1970
contract expired.
Relying on the establishment of the non-statutory labor exemption
by the Supreme Court,82 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
developed and applied a three-prong test (hereinafter “Mackey Test”)
to determine when a labor-management agreement in the sports
industry would be afforded non-statutory immunity from antitrust
review.83 First, “the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may
potentially be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the
restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective
bargaining relationship.”84
Second, “federal labor policy is
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought to
be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.”85 And third, “the policy favoring collective bargaining
is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws
only where the agreement sought to be exempted is a product of bona
fide arm’s-length bargaining.”86
In applying the Mackey Test, the court held that the Rozelle Rule
did not fall within the non-statutory labor exemption and was
82

See supra Part III-C.
Mackey, 543 F. 2d at 613. In doing so, the court affirmed the notion that the nonstatutory labor exemption is applicable to an employer, even though that is a non-labor
group, when the circumstances furthered federal labor policy. Id. at 612-13 (relying on
Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974) (stating: “We
reject Scooper Dooper’s contention that the labor exemption is unavailable to employers . . .
To preserve the integrity of the negotiating process, employers who bargain in good faith
must be entitled to claim the antitrust exemption.”)). See also Phil. World Hockey Club,
Inc. v. Phil. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
84
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613 (citing Connell Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1976); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v.
Jewel Tea, Inc. 381 U.S. 676 (1965)).
85
Id. (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676; Pennington, 381 U.S. 657).
86
Id. (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676).
83
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therefore subject to antitrust review.87 The court found that the
provision passed prong one, that the Rozelle Rule affected only the
parties to the bargaining relationship. Similarly, it passed prong two,
because it was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
However, the court found that it failed prong three, stating that the
Rozelle Rule had not been the subject of bona fide arm’s-length
bargaining for either the 1968 or the 1970 agreement, because the
provision imposed significant restrictions on the players to which
they would never have agreed in good faith bargaining. Even though
the NFL claimed that the provision was quid pro quo for the right of
players to negotiate their own salaries and for increased pension
benefits, the court determined that there was no such quid pro quo,
and that there had been inadequate arm’s-length bargaining.88
2. Wood v. National Basketball Association
In Wood,89 Leon Wood, a successful college basketball player,
brought an antitrust suit alleging that certain provisions of the
agreement between the NBA and the NBPA, including the salary
cap, college draft, and prohibition of player corporations, constituted
a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The salary cap provided
that if a team went over the cap, it was only permitted to offer a new
player a one-year contract for the minimum salary of $75,000. Even
though Wood was a first-round draft pick of the Philadelphia
Seventy-Sixers, the team was already over the cap, so it was forced
to offer him the minimum salary. Wood brought this suit claiming
that he would suffer the irreparable injury of either: a) being forced
to sign at far below his market value, or b) having to forego playing
basketball altogether for one year.
The district court found that the provisions affected only the
parties to the collective bargaining agreement, and involved
mandatory subjects of bargaining. It also found that the provisions
87
Id. at 616 (finding that the Rozelle Rule contravenes the rule of reason and therefore
is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
88
Id. at 615-16.
89
809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
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were the result of bona fide collective bargaining.90 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s determination
that the non-statutory labor exemption applied.
Judge Winter, writing for the court, denied Woods’ claim that he
could have received his full market value absent the salary cap
because that argument was at odds with federal labor policy.91 An
individual member of a union seeking to challenge a labor agreement
runs contrary to one of the fundamental policies of labor law, that is,
that employees may eliminate “individual-competition” through the
selection of an exclusive bargaining representative.92 National labor
policy favors the collective bargaining agreement over individual
needs. 93 Therefore, Wood had no right to bargain on his own behalf
since it would have violated the collective bargaining agreement.
Judge Winter rejected Wood’s argument that the draft and salary
cap were illegal because they affected employees outside the
bargaining unit, such as players in the draft who were not yet in the
NBA.94 The court determined that the term “employee” included
those outside the bargaining unit.95 For these reasons, the restraints
were shielded from antitrust scrutiny.
90

Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) aff’d, 809
F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). The district court applied the Mackey Test to find that the labor
exemption applied.
91
Wood, 809 F.2d at 959-60 (2d Cir. 1987).
92
Id. at 959 (citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)).
Federal labor policy thus allows employees to seek the best deal for the greatest
number by the exercise of collective rather than individual bargaining power.
Once an exclusive representative has been selected, the individual employee is
forbidden by federal law from negotiating directly with the employer absent the
representative’s consent, even though that employee may actually receive less
compensation under the collective bargaining agreement than he or she would
through individual negotiations.
See also 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Section 9(a) of the NLRA states, “representatives . . .
selected . . . by the majority of the employees in a unit . . . shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining.” J.I.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
93
Wood, 809 F.2d at 961.
94
Id. at 960 (refuting Wood’s argument that the draft and salary cap are illegal because
they affect employees outside the bargaining unit by saying that the NLRA explicitly
defines “employee” to include workers outside the bargaining unit).
95
Wood, 809 F.2d at 960.
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The test used in Wood and the Mackey Test, though differently
formulated, are not necessarily contradictory. In Wood, Judge
Winter recognized the similarities and differences between his
decision and others. He wrote, “[v]irtually all of the courts that have
addressed the present issues have reached a conclusion similar to
ours, although on somewhat different grounds.”96 The main factual
difference between these cases is that in Wood, the existing
collective bargaining agreement contained challenged provisions,
whereas in Mackey, the collective bargaining agreement that
contained the challenged provisions had expired. The Mackey court
concluded that the labor exemption did not apply because the
provision had not been properly negotiated before the agreement had
expired. Therefore, it would be impossible to predict the outcome of
either case if the facts had been different, such as if there had been a
valid agreement in effect, or if the NFL had negotiated the Rozelle
Rule to impasse before implementing it.
In Part V, Section B, this paper will address the issue of whether
the labor exemption is applicable in the event that a mandatory
subject has been negotiated to impasse and unilaterally implemented
by the employer. To have reached impasse, the parties would have
had to have participated in bona fide, good-faith bargaining, thus
presenting a factual situation different from Mackey.97 Fortunately,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.98
and provided more guidance and clarity on this question.
3. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
In Brown,99 the club owners wanted to institute a policy permitting
96
Id. at 962 n.6 (citing McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979);
Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)).
97
See supra Part III-D-1. In Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976), the Rozelle Rule did not receive immunity from the antitrust laws because the
court determined that the parties did not participate in good faith collective bargaining. Id.
98
518 U.S. 231 (1996). Before granting certiorari in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518
U.S. 231 (1996), the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Williams v. National Basketball
Association, 518 U.S. 1016 (1996) and Mackey v. National Football League, 434 U.S. 801
(1977).
99
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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each club to set up a developmental squad.100 These players would
have been paid a non-negotiable salary of $1,000 per week to play in
practice games, and sometimes to substitute for injured players. The
League bargained to impasse with the National Football League
Players’ Association (hereinafter “NFLPA”) and then unilaterally
implemented the terms of its last good-faith bargaining offer. The
Court determined that the non-statutory labor exemption shielded
this action from antitrust scrutiny.
The Court rationalized its determination by noting that labor law
protects unions from the harm that antitrust law seeks to prevent;
therefore, there was no harm in granting antitrust immunity where
labor law policies were being furthered. It is undisputed in labor
law, by both the NLRB and the courts, that after impasse, an
employer can unilaterally implement changes as long as they are no
more or less favorable than the pre-impasse proposals.101 If an
employer alters the terms of an implemented provision (from the last
rejected proposal), that would be considered a failure to bargain in
good faith and a ULP.102
In Brown, the Court identified a fundamental problem in the
application of antitrust law to labor relationships. It noted that if all
employers (in the multi-employer bargaining unit) were to impose
the terms of their last joint offer upon impasse, they would be
inviting an antitrust lawsuit based on the premise that identical
behavior may violate the antitrust laws.103 On the other hand, if any
or all employers, as individuals, would impose their own terms upon
impasse, they would be inviting a ULP charge.104 This would create
a situation in which employers could not predict the legal effects of
their bargaining positions.

100
This system was called Resolution G-2. It established that the developmental squad
would constitute up to six rookie or “first year” players, who, as free agents, had failed to
secure a position on the regular player roster.
101
Brown, 518 U.S. at 238.
102
Id. at 238-39 (where employer has not bargained in good faith, it may not implement
a term of employment upon impasse).
103
Id. at 241.
104
Id. at 241-42.

COHEN.FINAL

2002]

2/15/02 3:00 PM

WHY REVENUE SHARING IS A PERMISSIVE SUBJECT

631

The Court held that the non-statutory labor exemption shields a
multi-employer bargaining unit from antitrust attack when it
unilaterally implements, after impasse, the terms of its last good-faith
offer.105 However, the holding was limited. The ruling stated,
Our holding is not intended to insulate from antitrust
review every joint imposition of terms by employers, for
an agreement among employers could be sufficiently
distant in time and in circumstances from the collectivebargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust
intervention would not significantly interfere with that
[collective bargaining] process.106
Although not explicitly, the Court, in essence, applied the Mackey
Test. It stated that the agreement “grew out of, and was related to,
the lawful operation of the bargaining process [prong three]. It
involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate
collectively [prong two]. And it concerned only the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship [prong one].”107 The Supreme
Court decision in Brown has become the final authority on the
application of the non-statutory labor exemption to professional
sports restraints.
IV. IS REVENUE SHARING A MANDATORY OR PERMISSIVE SUBJECT?
To apply the non-statutory labor exemption to revenue sharing,
one must first determine whether it is a mandatory or a permissive
subject. This determination is necessary because some courts have
required that the subject be mandatory for the labor exemption to
apply.108 Others have remained silent on the issue.109 And still
105

Id. at 235-50.
Id. at 250.
107
Id.
108
See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); Mackey v. Nat’l Football
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
109
See Nat’l Hockey League and its Constituent Member Clubs and Nat’l Hockey
League Players Ass’n, (NLRB, Div. of Judges, 1999, unpublished opinion) [hereinafter
Nat’l Hockey League Case].
106
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others have extended the labor exemption to permissive subjects that
are contained in a labor agreement.110 In any case, to determine
whether the antitrust laws apply to revenue sharing, the question of
whether revenue sharing is a mandatory or permissive subject should
be answered.
The question of whether a revenue-sharing system between owners
is a mandatory or permissive subject has only been addressed
once.111 The issue was litigated in National Hockey League and its
Constituent Member Clubs and National Hockey League Players
Association, (hereinafter “National Hockey League”) but the court
did not make a determination because the NHLPA had waived its
right to assert its claims.112 Although the court in Wood113 found that
“revenue sharing” was a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining,114 Wood involved sharing between NBA owners and
players.115 This is an important distinction because the revenuesharing program in Wood directly involved player money, whereas in
National Hockey League, the effect of revenue sharing on player
salaries was secondary. A mandatory subject must “settle an aspect
of the relationship between the employer and employees”116 and the
revenue-sharing system this paper is analyzing concerns the owners’
relationship, not the owner-player relationship. To determine
whether revenue sharing among owners is a mandatory or permissive
subject, it is helpful to study National Hockey League because it
outlines the arguments for both sides.

110
See Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 1983);
James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915 (D.C. Del. 1984).
111
Wood addressed revenue sharing but that involved sharing between players and clubs.
Also, there were cases that addressed systems instituted to rectify competitive imbalance,
such as, the Rozelle Rule and the draft, but no cases have address revenue sharing among
owners specifically. See Mackey, 543 F.2d 606; Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d
954 (2d Cir. 1987).
112
Nat’l Hockey League Case, supra note 109.
113
809 F.2d 954.
114
Id. at 962.
115
In Wood, the revenue-sharing system allocated a minimum percentage of league
revenue to the players, thus creating a direct effect on the players. Id.
116
Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971).
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A. National Hockey League and its Constituent Member Clubs and
National Hockey League Players Association
In National Hockey League,117 the National Hockey League
Players Association (hereinafter “NHLPA”) filed ULP charges for
various acts by the National Hockey League (hereinafter “NHL”),
one of which included a revenue-sharing system. The revenuesharing system was developed because Canadian small-market teams
were having difficulty retaining their players after free agency, due
to competition from big-market teams, specifically in the right of
first refusal context.
In the NHL, there was a system in place that gave an incumbent
team the right to offer a player a new contract that included a right of
first refusal when the contract expired. This gave the incumbent
team a right to match another team’s offer.118 Offers from other
teams were often crafted to make it difficult for the incumbent team
to match.119 As the value of the Canadian dollar dropped against the
U.S. dollar, the Canadian small-market teams’ difficulty in retaining
players increased. The discrepancy in the value of the Canadian
dollar impeded the League’s ability to keep financially successful
franchises in Canada, and it was necessary that it be dealt with
through supplemental financing by the NHL. There were many
reasons that it was crucial for the League to support having
financially viable franchises in Canada. For example, the NHL
received more television revenue from the seven teams located in
Canada than it did from the nineteen teams located in the United
States, not to mention the fact that hockey originated in Canada.120
To combat this increasing discrepancy, the League proposed a
program to the NHLPA wherein a Canadian team could match the
U.S. offer in an equivalent amount of Canadian dollars.

117

Nat’l Hockey League Case, supra note 109.
The right of first refusal meant that the incumbent team had a right to match an offer
by another club within seven days, or in the absence of a matching offer, to draft picks as
compensation.
119
Nat’l Hockey League Case, supra note 109, at 4.
120
Id.
118
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The NHLPA rejected this offer and proposed an alternative
currency equalization plan in which the League and the NHLPA
would contribute money to a fund to help small-market Canadian
teams compensate for the currency differential. There was no
agreement reached and the currency equalization plan was not
negotiated again.121
In July 1995, the NHL Board of Governors unilaterally adopted its
proposed revenue-sharing system (hereinafter “Plan”). It had two
phases. Phase One was the Group II Equalization Plan122 wherein
small-market Canadian teams would receive a subsidy based on a
precise formula to match the other team’s offer so that the incumbent
could compete for its players.123 Phase Two of the Plan funded
Canadian teams in the bottom half of League revenues. There were
many eligibility requirements for Phase Two, one of which was that
the teams’ player payroll had to be at or below the average team
payroll in the League to receive the full level of assistance. This was
referred to as the “player payroll” provision. Teams with higher
player payrolls received less funding.124
The NHLPA claimed it had no knowledge of the Plan until
December 22, 1995 when the League faxed a copy of a
memorandum to the NHLPA detailing the Plan. However, the Plan
had been widely publicized prior to December 1995.125 In March
1996, the NHLPA advised the NHL that they objected to Phases One
and Two of the Plan, and specifically to the “player payroll”
limitations of Phase Two. In October 1997, the NHL issued a
resolution that deleted the “player payroll” aspect of Phase Two
121

Id. at 5-6.
The Plan defined the eligible teams as those Canadian teams who match a Group II
offer sheet from a U.S. team and who are in the bottom two-thirds of the NHL in team
revenues.
123
The formula was: the amount of compensation, converted to Canadian dollars,
contained in the offer sheet; less the player’s prior season’s compensation, converted to
Canadian dollars, or the Canadian team’s qualifying offer, converted to Canadian dollars,
whichever is greater; multiplied by the prevailing conversion rate between Canadian and
U.S. dollars. Nat’l Hockey League Case, supra note 109, at 6. In the 1995-96 season, the
League funded Phase One with $7 million from League generated revenues. Id.
124
Id. at 11. In the 1996-97 season, funding was estimated at $7.5 million. Id.
125
Id. at 14-18.
122
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because the NHL agreed that the provision “providing for reductions
in subsidies based on a club’s payroll exceeding the League average
payroll, constituted a mandatory subject for the purposes of
collective bargaining under section 9(a) of the Act.”126
In its findings, the NLRB held that the NHLPA consented to the
continuation of the other eligibility requirements of Phase Two,
absent the “player payroll” requirement.127 Therefore, the League
did not violate section 8(a)(5) with its implementation of the nonplayer payroll provisions of Phase Two. However, the NHL violated
8(a)(5) with its implementation of the player payroll provision of
Phase Two, which had remained in effect from January 1996 until
October 1997 when the NHL stipulated that the player payroll
provision was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.128
The NHLPA argued that Phase One and its revenue-sharing
system was a mandatory subject because it affected player mobility,
which is a critical term and condition of employment.129 As
discussed, the court did not decide the merits of this issue; rather, it
dismissed the claim by finding that the NHLPA’s ULP charge was
untimely with regard to Phase One, since the filing and service was
six months and three days after the NHLPA was “incontrovertibly on
notice” of the alleged ULP.130
This case analysis illustrates the typical arguments advanced by
sports leagues and players’ associations with regard to a revenuesharing system. Unfortunately, the issue of Phase One was avoided
in National Hockey League, and it left the following conflicting
conclusions, either: a) Phase One’s revenue-sharing system was a
mandatory subject, but the duty to bargain was waived by the Players
Association; or b) Phase One’s revenue-sharing system was a
permissive subject, and thus, there was no requirement to bargain,
regardless of the waiver. As a result, the task of determining

126
127
128
129
130

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 19-20.
Id.
Nat’l Hockey League Case, supra note 109, at 12.
Id. at 18.
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whether revenue sharing is a mandatory or permissive subject
remains.
B. Revenue Sharing Is Not a Mandatory Subject—It Is Permissive
Because It Does Not Affect the Players’ Terms and Conditions
of Employment
Section 8(a)(5) and section 8(d) of the NLRA require bargaining
only with respect to “issues that settle an aspect of the relationship
between the employer and the employee.”131 These issues have been
termed mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, and include
subjects such as “wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment.”132 Permissive subjects may be raised at the bargaining
table to be discussed in good faith, and they may be incorporated into
an enforceable agreement, but cannot be insisted upon by either party
at impasse.133 The relationship between revenue sharing and the
players’ terms and conditions of employment is too speculative to
make revenue sharing a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
Despite this indirect relationship, some may argue that a revenuesharing system does not affect the players’ terms and conditions of
employment on its face, but it has the effect of limiting player
salaries and therefore is mandatory. In Mackey,134 to determine
whether the Rozelle Rule was a mandatory subject, the court
recognized that on its face, the Rozelle Rule does not deal with
wages, hours and other terms or conditions of employment;135 but the
practical effect of the Rule restricted player mobility and decreased
player salaries, and therefore, it was found to be a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining.136
However, the application of the
131
Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
132
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349.
133
Id.
134
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
135
See supra Part III-D-1. The Rozelle Rule is a system that required a franchise,
signing a player who had played out his option year, to compensate the player’s former
franchise.
136
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
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“practical effect” test to revenue sharing is less direct than with the
Rozelle Rule. There are two ways that revenue sharing could affect
the players’ terms and conditions of employment. First, if team
owners are required to share revenue, they will not have as much
money to pay player salaries. However, this argument is based on
the assumption that team owners operate with a limited pool of
funds.
Second, team owners might not pay for high-priced players
because they may not reap the financial rewards of having those
players on their rosters. For example, if the Yankees were to sign
Derek Jeter for an exorbitant amount of money, and were required to
share local revenues (which arguably would be higher if Jeter were
on the roster), then the Yankees might lose their incentive to bid on
such high-priced players. However, the validity of this argument is
based on a number of assumptions. First, that club owners who have
the money to spend, and would have been willing to spend it absent
revenue sharing, would not spend it if there was revenue sharing.
Second, that team owners would only spend money on top players to
make money. And third, that television broadcast contracts,
merchandise licensing contracts, and gate receipts would increase as
a direct result of signing an individual player.
The validity of each of these assumptions is questionable. Club
owners who have the money, might spend it on player salaries even
with revenue-sharing measures in effect.137 There are many reasons
that team owners spend money on particular players aside from
wanting to reap the financial benefits of having that player on the
roster, such as their passion for the game,138 having their teams
perform better in the season, and fulfilling their egos.139 Most
137
In MLB, since the collective bargaining agreement went into effect with their system
of revenue sharing, the average player salary has increased from $1.3 million in 1997 to
almost $2 million in 2000. Jerry Crasnick, Union Exercises Contract Option Through 2001
(Aug. 29, 2000), at http://www.detnews.com/2000/tigers/0008/29/sports-112447.htm (last
visited Feb. 1, 2002).
138
Steven H. Lee, Team Owners Sound Off at University of Texas, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2001) (Mark Cuban, owner of the Dallas Mavericks said, “If you don’t love
it as a sport, you won’t love it as a business, sports is a business of passion.”), at
http://www.bus.utexas.edu/news/pressreleases/sports_panel.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
139
Mike Bianchi, A Hunger Beyond The Game Text, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 10,
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importantly, much of the external revenue received by team owners
relates to whether the team is in a big or small market, not whether a
team has a specific player on the roster.140
The practical effect of revenue sharing on player contracts is
arguably too remote to make this a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. Management is only required to bargain over a subject
when its “relation to conditions of employment is close and
immediate, not remote or merely esthetical.”141 Therefore, it is likely
that revenue sharing is a permissive subject of collective bargaining.
This paper will now address the issue of the labor exemption as it
applies to mandatory and/or permissive subjects of collective
bargaining.

V. WHETHER THE LABOR EXEMPTION APPLIES TO MANDATORY
AND/OR PERMISSIVE SUBJECTS?
Although Part IV concluded that revenue sharing is likely to be a
permissive subject, in practice, it is difficult to predict what a court
would actually determine because a court has never directly
addressed this issue.142 In the application of the labor exemption to
revenue sharing, there are two questions to analyze. First, if revenue
sharing is found to be permissive, as this paper has argued, and a
revenue-sharing provision is negotiated into a labor agreement,
would the labor exemption apply? And second, if revenue sharing is
found to be mandatory, contrary to the conclusions of Part IV, and is

2001, available at 2001 WL 28422425 (stating that owners own sports teams for their egos
not for business purposes).
140
Paul Evan Kovatis, Soaring Baseball Pay Points To Declining Values – Speaking Up,
THE STAR LEDGER, Mar. 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL 16670394 (reporting that big
market teams remain unaffected by fans who are bitter about competitive imbalance and
overpaid players because of their cable television revenues and corporate season ticket
plans, which almost guarantee the outrageous salaries that the teams are paying their
players).
141
Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council and Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 203
NLRB 958, 962 (1973), remanded on other grounds, 503 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1974).
142
See supra Part IV.
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unilaterally implemented by the employer, would the labor
exemption apply?143
A. The Labor Exemption Does Not Apply to Permissive Subject
Provisions in a Labor Agreement
If revenue sharing is determined to be a permissive subject, it is
questionable whether the labor exemption would apply when the
provision is negotiated into a labor agreement. There is conflicting
authority as to whether the non-statutory labor exemption applies to
permissive subjects of collective bargaining when the permissive
subject provision is in the labor agreement.144
There are a plethora of cases suggesting that the subject must be
mandatory to have the labor exemption apply. In Mackey,145 prong
two of the three-prong test to determine whether the labor exemption
applies was that the challenged provision must have been a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining.146 In Brown,147 the
Court said that in order to have the labor exemption apply, one of the
necessary prerequisites was that, “it involved a matter that the parties
were required to negotiate collectively.”148 These cases relied upon
the foundation of the labor exemption in the Supreme Court. In
Jewel Tea,149 the Court held that the subject had to be mandatory to
have the labor exemption apply. However, the grounds for this last
holding may be questionable.
Justice White stated in Jewel Tea, “if the unions had made such a
[permissive] demand and Jewel had agreed and the United States or
an injured party had challenged the agreement under the antitrust
143

It is not necessary to analyze the hypothetical scenario if revenue sharing is
mandatory and it is in the agreement, because it is obvious that the labor exemption would
apply. In addition, it is not necessary to analyze if revenue sharing is permissive and not in
the agreement, because it is obvious that the labor exemption would not apply.
144
See Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1983); see also
James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915 (D.C. Del. 1984).
145
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
146
See supra Part III-D-1.
147
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
148
See supra Part III-D-3.
149
381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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laws, we seriously doubt that either the union or Jewel could claim
immunity by reason of the labor exemption”150 The Court relied on
this statement to determine that the labor exemption applied to the
marketing-hours provision, because it was mandatory. Although the
holding required the subject to be mandatory, the analysis is weak.
The source of the requirement to make the subject mandatory was
the Court’s “doubt” that a permissive subject could be shielded from
antitrust scrutiny. Due to the lack of certainty regarding this aspect
of the rationale, it is necessary to investigate the issue further.
In Feather v. United Mine Workers of America,151 the court
recognized that the non-statutory labor exemption “generally applies
when a union, acting with a non-labor party seeks to attain goals
which are mandatory or permissive subjects of bargaining under the
National Labor Relations Act, unless the Union acts with predatory
anti-competitive purpose.”152 If this were the standard, a permissive
subject could receive antitrust immunity as long as there were no
predatory anti-competitive purposes. As discussed, the intent of
revenue sharing is to rectify the competitive imbalance in
professional sports, which is not a “predatory” anti-competitive
purpose. Rather, its purpose is to prevent the product from becoming
so unsuccessful that the only alternative is insolvency.
The court cited the Supreme Court in Connell and Pennington to
support this proposition, but those decisions did not support the
court’s conclusion.153 In Connell, the Court did not specify whether
the non-statutory labor exemption applied to permissive as well as
mandatory subjects. It only said, “a proper accommodation between
the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the
National Labor Relations Act, and the congressional policy favoring
free competition in business markets requires that some unionemployer agreements be accorded limited non-statutory exemption
150

Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added).
711 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1983).
152
Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added) (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)).
153
Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing
Connell, 421 U.S. 616; Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 381 U.S. 676, 729-30 (1965)).
151
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for antitrust sanctions.”154 Similarly, in Pennington, there was
nothing said that allowed or barred the application of the labor
exemption to permissive subjects. However, the rationale used to
apply the non-statutory labor exemption suggested that the Court
limited the application of the labor exemption to mandatory subjects.
It said, “wages lie at the heart of those subjects about which
employers and union must bargain.”155 Furthermore, the Court
suggested that the subject being exempted needed to be more than
just a mandatory subject to have the non-statutory labor exemption
apply. It said, “this is not to say that an agreement resulting from
union-employer negotiations is automatically exempt from Sherman
Act scrutiny simply because the negotiations involve a compulsory
subject of bargaining.”156
Therefore, it appears as though
Pennington supports the opposite proposition, which is that the nonstatutory labor exemption only applies to mandatory subjects.
The court in Feather157 claimed that the labor exemption applied
to mandatory and permissive subjects of collective bargaining, but
this proposition was not supported by any of the cases it cited.
Furthermore, there are no subsequent cases that support the holding.
Brown158 made it clear that the labor exemption applies only to
mandatory subjects. This is the marquee case to determine whether
the labor exemption applies in the professional sports context.159
If revenue sharing is determined to be a permissive subject of
collective bargaining, as was argued in this paper, the non-statutory
labor exemption would not apply. Therefore, the antitrust laws
would be applicable to revenue sharing and the players’ association
might have a means of legal recourse via the Sherman Act. That

154

Connell, 421 U.S. at 622 (emphasis added) (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676).
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664.
156
Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
157
711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 1983).
158
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
159
Id. at 250. In fact, the Supreme Court held that in order to apply the non-statutory
antitrust exemption, one of the requirements was that “it involved a matter that the parties
were required to negotiate collectively.” Id.
155
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does not mean, however, that revenue sharing would necessarily be
an antitrust violation.160
B. The Labor Exemption Applies to the Unilateral Imposition of
Mandatory Subjects after Impasse
If revenue sharing were determined to be a mandatory subject,
contrary to the conclusions in this paper, and the system were
unilaterally imposed by management after impasse, the non-statutory
labor exemption would apply. Courts have applied the non-statutory
labor exemption to mandatory subjects because it promotes federal
labor policies that favor free and unfettered collective bargaining.161
The fact that a subject is unilaterally imposed is irrelevant as to
whether the labor exemption would apply, as long as management
complies with the other requirements of labor law.162 To comply
with labor law, management must bargain to impasse and impose
only the terms of their last good-faith offer.
In Brown,163 the NFLPA argued that the non-statutory labor
exemption should not apply where there is no labor-management
agreement.164 They relied upon the language of Connell, which
stated that the non-statutory labor exemption applies to “unionemployer agreements.”165
The Brown Court rejected this
interpretation of the statement and determined that the Connell Court
had limited its holding to situations where there was a collective
bargaining agreement because the Court had not yet had an
opportunity to address a challenge without an agreement in place.166
160

This paper will not go through an antitrust analysis of revenue sharing.
Id. at 236 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5); 158(d); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958)).
162
Id. at 238. “Both the Board and the Courts have held that, after impasse, labor law
permits employers unilaterally to implement changes in pre-existing conditions, but only
insofar as the new terms meet carefully circumscribed conditions.” Id. These “conditions”
were described as incorporating pre-impasse proposals into the unilateral imposition, and
collective bargaining without committing an unfair labor practice. Id. at 239.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 243.
165
Id. (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616, 622 (1975)).
166
Id. at 238-39.
161
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Furthermore, the Court responded, “one cannot mean the principle
literally—that the exemption applies only to understandings
embodied in a collective bargaining agreement—for the collective
bargaining process may take place before the making of an
agreement or after an agreement has expired.”167
Furthermore, the NFLPA argued that the non-statutory labor
exemption should not apply without union consent because it leaves
the union without a means of recourse for self-protection, and it tips
the bargaining scale in favor of the employer.168 The NFLPA argued
that this leaves the union with inadequate protection since the union
was already opposed to the last good-faith offer (which brought
about the impasse), and the unilateral imposition by the employer
would still not be a ULP.169 The Players Association was concerned
that unions might be discouraged from collective bargaining if a
provision that was unilaterally implemented without union consent
were shielded from antitrust scrutiny. The Union argued that the
effect of the exemption should not counter its purpose to encourage
collective bargaining.170
The argument that a union would go unprotected without the
shield of the labor exemption does not criticize the application of the
non-statutory labor exemption; rather, it criticizes federal labor law.
It is established that management can satisfy the good-faith
bargaining requirement without union consent as long as the parties
have negotiated in good faith to impasse.171 In NLRB v. Katz, 172 the
Supreme Court barred an employer from making any unilateral
changes in existing employment conditions without securing consent
from, or negotiating to an impasse with the union.173 Once the
employer has negotiated to impasse, he has the ability to unilaterally
impose a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; however, the
167

Id. at 243.
Steven D. Buchholz, Run Kick, and (Im)passe: Expanding Employers’ Ability to
Unilaterally Impose Conditions of Employment After Impasse in Brown v. Pro Football, 81
MINN. L. REV. 1201 (1997).
169
Marvine, supra note 12, at 642.
170
Id. at 646.
171
Brown, 518 U.S. at 236-50.
172
369 U.S. 736 (1962).
173
Id.
168
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condition must be “reasonably comprehended” within the employer’s
pre-impasse proposals.174 In other words, the employer cannot
impose more or less favorable terms on the union after impasse. To
do so would be considered a ULP and that is the union’s
protection.175
Unions have always had legal recourse through a ULP charge if an
employer attempted to unilaterally impose a provision before
impasse was reached, or if the employer attempted to implement any
new provisions subsequent to an impasse in negotiations.176 The
labor exemption must apply post-impasse because if it ceased to
apply at impasse, it would be too difficult for employers to predict
the ramifications of their actions since the parties might reach
impasse numerous times during their negotiations.177 Therefore, if
revenue sharing is determined to be a mandatory subject of
bargaining, the non-statutory labor exemption will apply.
CONCLUSION
The professional sports industry depends on its club owners and
leagues to implement systems, such as revenue sharing, in order to
correct competitive imbalances that exist between teams. If revenue
sharing is considered to be a permissive subject, as this paper has
argued, the non-statutory labor exemption would not apply as an
antitrust defense for teams or leagues. On the other hand, if revenue
sharing is determined to be a mandatory subject, the non-statutory
labor exemption would apply, even if there was no agreement in
place, as long as the parties bargained in good faith to impasse. In
this paper, it was suggested that leagues should be prepared to defend
antitrust claims by players associations if revenue sharing is
determined to be a permissive subject. As the market value for
players increases, the wealth disparity between club owners will
174
Brown, 518 U.S. at 238 (citing Storer Communications, Inc. and Nat’l Ass’n of
Broad. Employees & Technicians, AFL-CIO, 294 NLRB 1056, 1090 (1989); NLRB v. Katz,
369 U.S. 736, 745 n.12 (1962)).
175
Id. at 238-39.
176
Id. at 238-50.
177
Id. at 245-46.

COHEN.FINAL

2002]

2/15/02 3:00 PM

WHY REVENUE SHARING IS A PERMISSIVE SUBJECT

645

become more apparent. Over time, this will have a detrimental effect
on on-the-field competition. Revenue sharing equalizes the disparity
among club owners by redistributing wealth to financially weaker
teams. By sharing revenues, the goals of owners, leagues and sports
fans can simultaneously be met.

